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Abstract
Empirical evidence illustrates that diversity generates both economic costs and
benefits. This paper develops a theoretical model that accounts for the positive and
deleterious effects of heterogeneity. First, an expanded Solow Growth Model demon-
strates that the direct effects of diversity can be positive or negative, and depend upon
the size of fixed parameter values. Second, diversity also influences individuals’ location
decisions. Segregation (variation of diversity across regions) always reduces national
output per worker, so if diversity induces integration, it indirectly augments productiv-
ity as well. Finally, political policies aimed at reducing interaction costs across groups
may actually reduce aggregate output per worker by encouraging segregation.
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1 Introduction
A growing body of empirical growth literature is assessing whether racial (or ethnic) diver-
sity leads to macroeconomic gains or losses. The earliest economic analyses typically found
evidence for the former. Groups often organize according to ethnic or racial identities to
compete for rents, public goods, and favored political policies that detract from productive
activity. In the extreme, diversity can lead to social conflict, exploitation, and violence.
Quantitatively, Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that “a movement from complete hetero-
geneity to complete homogeneity... is associated with an income increase of 3.8 times.”1
Recent work, in contrast, highlights the gains from diversity. Ottaviano and Peri (2006)
find that cultural diversity (based upon immigrants’ countries of origin) complements pro-
duction and boosts native-born wages and productivity in US cities. Sparber (2007) analyzes
US industries and argues that racial diversity generates productivity gains for most sectors
of the economy. The effects are particularly large for industries employing highly educated
workers, which suggests that diversity complements the decision makers of the labor force.2
This paper develops a cohesive theory to understand the net macroeconomic effects of
diversity. I begin with a standard Solow production function and expand it by introduc-
ing two key features to demonstrate that the direct effects of diversity may be positive or
negative. First, the model recognizes the possible existence of complementarities between
workers of different types. Second, it includes an expression to capture the costs of commu-
nication, interaction, and conflict across groups. A simple relationship between the costs of
cross-group communication and potential complementarities determines whether the direct
effects of diversity result in macroeconomic gains or losses.
Next, I introduce a utility function that assumes individuals prefer to live among mem-
bers of their own group. Segregation arises when regions have differing levels of diversity,
yet agents have no incentive to engage in interregional migration. That is, people may be
indifferent between living in a region that offers high wages and another region that main-
tains a larger population of individuals from their own group. If minorities reside in each
region, then maximum aggregate output per worker occurs when groups fully integrate across
regions. Segregation therefore reduces productivity.
Diversity plays a critical role in determining the location and migration decisions of
individuals and thus indirectly affects productivity as well. Segregation tends to occur when
minorities comprise a small share of the labor force. Complementarities imply that an
1Alesina et al (2003) provide a recent replication of these results. Also see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005),
Fukuyama (1999), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Mauro (1995).
2For evidence in the management literature, see O’Reilly, Williams, and Barsade (1998), Cox and Blake
(1991), or Cox, Lobel, and McLeod (1991).
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individual could earn a higher wage by moving to the region in which members from his/her
own group are more scarce, but the costs of interaction are sufficiently low when little
diversity exists that own-group preferences outweigh potential wage gains. Costs become
more apparent as diversity increases. This encourages individuals to seek higher wages and
integrate.
Exogenous policy-driven costs of diversity operate in a similar way. Segregation arises
when the cost of interaction with other groups is low since minorities are willing to sacrifice
wage gains in order to live and work among other minorities. When interaction becomes
more difficult, the wage penalty from forming such enclaves rises and groups integrate.
Since segregation always reduces productivity, political policies encumbering communication
between groups can ironically promote productivity by encouraging integration.
The net macroeconomic effects of diversity critically depend upon whether minority
groups evenly distribute themselves across regions or instead form segregated clusters. The
ramifications of the theoretical model mandate that cross-country empirical assessments of
diversity and productivity also consider the role of segregation. In the absence of reliable seg-
regation data, however, alternative methods must be employed to understand the magnitude
of diversity’s productivity consequences. Therefore, I summarize my analysis by simulating
an economy with parameter values that characterize the United States. Results imply that
the increase in racial diversity among US college-educated workers between 1990 and 2000
may have augmented output per worker by 0.6% and that this diversity led to a level of
productivity that is also 0.6% higher than what would occur in a homogenous society.
2 Production and the Direct Effects of Diversity
2.1 Production Function
Many economists have developed theories of diversity and production, but few have sought
to capture both the costs and benefits of heterogeneity. Caselli and Coleman (2002) create
a model of greed-motivated conflict to explain the prevalence of ethnic tension. Individuals
organize into groups that compete over a country’s wealth. Conflict escalates when losers
find it difficult to switch alliances and capture the spoils of war, as is the case when groups
organize according to racial or ethnic identities. The authors do not, however, recognize any
benefits of employing a heterogeneous workforce.
Conversely, Page (2007) and Hong and Page (2004) focus on the problem solving capa-
bilities of a workforce and argue, “A collection of problem solvers of diverse abilities tends to
jointly outperform a collection of high quality problem solvers... Problem solvers differ along
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two dimensions: their encodings of problems, perspectives, and the algorithms they apply
in searching for solutions, heuristics.” They assume that the best problem solvers tend to
take similar approaches when encountering tasks, but that diversity aids the decision making
process by bringing new perspectives and heuristics to a task.
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) provide a valuable model that recognizes both the positive
and negative effects of diversity.3 First, groups complement each other in production ac-
cording to a Dixit-Stiglitz love-of-variety term
(
N∑
i=1
Li
α
)
. For every unit of labor supplied,
however, only a fraction (1− τ ) is available for production. They interpret this as a resource
cost of interaction (or communication) between groups. Interaction costs, production com-
plementarities, exogenous capital (K), and technology (A) combine to produce output (Y )
according to Equation (1).
Y = F (K,L1, ..., LN) = AK
1−α(1− γ)α
N∑
i=1
Li
α (1)
I advocate a model of production that modifies (1) but preserves three features. First,
it must allow for the possibility of complementarities between workers of different types.
Second, it should include a term to capture the costs of communication, interaction, and
conflict across groups. Third, an ideal model of diversity and productivity should nest more
traditional production theories within it.
Suppose a country is divided into N unique labor groups.4 All agents work so that the
population and employment of group i both equal Li. Members from varied groups com-
plement each other in production according to C (L1, ..., LN , σ, α), where σ is an exogenous
parameter that determines the degree of substitutability between groups and α is the share
of output paid to labor. Though potential complementarities exist, interaction and com-
munication across groups may be costly. Firms retain and sell only a fraction of output,
R (L1, ..., LN , γ), where γ is an exogenous cost parameter.
5 These factors combine with ex-
ogenous capital (K) and technology (A) to produce output (Y ) according to the general
function in (2).
Y = AK1−α ·R (L1, ..., LN , γ) · C (L1, ..., LN , σ, α) (2)
3Also see Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), and Lazear (1999).
4Groups may be differentiated by any factor, including race, ethnicity, gender, age, educational attain-
ment, etc. This paper, however, will focus on the role of race.
5Many empirical papers note that institutional factors such as the system of government or stage of
development can play an important role in determining the net effects of diversity. (See Collier (2000),
Collier (2001), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)). Thus, exogenous parameter values may vary across
countries.
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Consider the complementarity and cost components of (2) in turn. Economists have long
adopted production functions in which an increase in the variety of intermediate capital in-
puts will augment output.6 Equation (2) instead proposes that a variety of labor inputs will
enhance productivity. Ottaviano and Peri (2005) adopt a similar philosophy and model la-
bor complementarities with a love-of-variety term, C (·) =
N∑
i=1
Li
α. More variety (greater N)
always increases output for a given labor force size, and output is maximized if each group
contributes the same number of workers. As an alternative, I employ the CES complemen-
tarity term in Equation (3) for fixed N . The advantage of this specification is that labor
types may be grossly substitutable or complementary.7 As σ approaches negative infinity,
workers from different groups become perfect complements. When σ = 0, labor types enter
the production function as Cobb-Douglas. Finally, σ = 1 represents the standard production
assumption that labor types are perfect substitutes.
C (L1, ..., LN , σ, α) =
(
N∑
i=1
Lσi
)α
σ
, (3)
where σ ∈ (−∞, 1]
Assume a “semi-symmetric” labor force demography with one majority and N−1 minor-
ity groups. Each minority group comprises a share of the labor force equal to Θ, leaving the
majority with a share M equal to 1− (N − 1)Θ. (Also assume that Θ < 1
2·(N−1)
to ensure a
majority group exists). An increase in Θ implies that the minority share of the labor force
comes closer to that of the majority and that diversity rises. Under these semi-symmetric
assumptions, the complementarity expression in (3) reduces to Equation (4). The marginal
effects of increasing Θ are positive so long as Θ < 1
N
.8 Increasing the labor force share of
minority groups will cause labor complementarities to rise for σ < 1.
C (·) = Lα · ((N − 1) ·Θσ +Mσ)ασ (4)
∂C (·)
∂Θ
= α · (N − 1) · Lα · (Θσ−1 −Mσ−1) (5)
· ((N − 1) ·Θσ +Mσ)α−σσ
The production function in (2) also accounts for the costs of diversity. Again, I follow
6See Ethier (1982) and Romer (1987) for early examples.
7The degree of substitutability is likely to vary across industries and countries (see Sparber (2007)).
However, this paper will hold σ constant to facilitate better understanding of the effects of diversity.
8The assumption that a majority group exists assures that this condition holds.
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the lead of Ottaviano and Peri (2005) who measure retained output by including a multi-
plicative term ranging from zero to one, R (·) = (1− γ). The parameter γ is open to broad
interpretation — it could reflect the cost of offering employees language classes or formal
diversity training, prevailing tension and conflict across groups, or the expense of offering
group-specific public goods.9 Also note that it is not a function of the total size of the labor
force, so there are no scale effects to diversity costs. Unfortunately, however, by expressing
costs as a multiplicative constant, the quantity is unresponsive to a country’s demographic
shifts. That is, firms bear communication costs even if all workers belong to the same group.
Instead, I adopt the cost expression in (6). Note that costs reduce to exp
(
−γ ·
N∏
i=1
θi
)
,
where θi is the labor force share of group i, so that diversity costs remain impervious to scale
effects. More importantly, the function assumes that exogenous interaction costs dispropor-
tionately encumber diverse societies. That is, if language classes become more expensive,
it will mostly affect firms training a highly diverse workstaff. If inter-group tensions rise,
heterogenous countries would experience vast losses. The quantity of output retained by the
firm is maximized when one group comprises the entire labor force. It is minimized when all
groups have an equal labor force share.10
R (L1, ..., LN , γ) = exp

−γ ·
N∏
i=1
Li(
N∑
i=1
Li
)N
 , (6)
where γ ≥ 0
Equation (6) guarantees that the costs of interaction increase in γ. Small γ values
approximate the typical production assumption of γ = 0, and large values are necessary to
generate significant losses of output. Political policies are likely to affect γ, which may vary
9See Lazear (1999) for a model of diversity and language. See Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina and
La Ferrara (2005) for empirical and theoretical evidence on diversity and public goods provision, respectively.
10An alternative cost expression with qualitatively similar results would specify R (·) =
exp
−γ ·
1−
N∑
i=1
L2i(
N∑
i=1
Li
)2

, which reduces to R (·) = exp(−γ ·(1− N∑
i=1
θ2i
))
. The advantage of this
approach is that γ is immediately interpretable as the coefficient of the “ethnolinguistic fractionalization
index” typically estimated in the empirical literature (assuming that σ = 1). Unfortunately, however, many
of the conclusions in Section 3.2 become less clear. Further information about this methodology is available
upon request.
Both the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index and the expression in (6) implicitly assume that cultural
distance and language differences between any two groups will not depend upon the groups considered. For
empirical counter-examples, see Ginsburgh and Weber (2005), Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), or Inglehart,
Basanez, and Moreno (1998).
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across countries. Later sections of the paper will assess the ramifications of such actions.
The log-linear nature of (6) has particularly important implications. First, it facilitates
closed form solutions that permit key insights throughout the paper. Second, values are
easy to interpret: γ ·
N∏
i=1
θi represents the percentage of output lost due to diversity, so
γ is the marginal percentage of output lost from a change in demography. For example,
assume the semi-symmetric case holds so that retained output reduces to Equation (7).
Equation (8) indicates that increasing the size of each minority group delivers detrimental
consequences for the portion of output retained by the firm as the costs of interaction,
communication, and conflict rise. Further suppose that N = 5 groups exist and that each
of four minority groups maintain 5% of the labor force (leaving the majority group with
the remaining 80%). Equation (7) implies that firms lose approximately 0.5% of output for
every 1000-unit increase in γ (see Figure 1).
R (·) = exp (−γ ·ΘN−1 ·M) (7)
∂R (·)
∂Θ
= −γ · (N − 1) · (1−NΘ) ·ΘN−2 (8)
· exp (−γ ·ΘN−1 ·M)
Appropriate values of γ are debatable. If special training programs are the only cost
of diversity, and each employee invests 1.25 workdays of a 250-day workyear to training,
then γ = 1000. Alternatively, Easterly and Levine (1997) estimate that a movement from
complete homogeneity to a level of diversity with N = 5 and Θ = 0.05 will be associated
with a 47% decline in output. This implies γ = 94, 000 (if σ = 1), though it is doubtful costs
are this high in developed countries. In any case, it is clear that γ can represent high values
and a country will still be able to retain significant levels of its output.
The complementarity term in (3) and cost expression (6) combine to form the production
function in Equation (9), which satisfies the criteria established at the beginning of this
section. It exhibits constant returns to capital and labor, allows for both interaction costs
and potential complementarities across types of workers, and reduces to the standard Solow
production function with exogenous technological growth in the special case of γ = 0 and
σ = 1.
Y = F (K,L1, ..., LN) = A ·K1−α · exp

−γ ·
N∏
i=1
Li(
N∑
i=1
Li
)N
 ·
(
N∑
i=1
Lσi
)α
σ
(9)
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Figure 1: Interaction Costs and Lost Output. Output declines by 0.5% for every 1000 unit
increase in γ, assuming N = 5 groups exist and each minority group maintains 5% of the
labor force.
Equation (10) describes output per worker under the semi-symmetric assumptions. In-
creasing the size of minority groups has two opposing effects. On the one hand, a large
minority presence requires firms to expend effort and energy facilitating inter-group com-
munication, which causes productivity (y ≡ Y
L
) to fall. On the other hand, diversity will
generate production gains due to complementarities between workers.
y = A
(
K
L
)1−α
(10)
· exp (−γΘN−1M)
· ((N − 1)Θσ +Mσ)ασ
∂y
∂Θ
=
(
y · (N − 1)
(N − 1)Θσ +M)σ
)
(11)
·(α · (Θσ−1 −Mσ−1)
−γ · (1−NΘ) ((N − 1)Θσ +Mσ)ΘN−2)
Not surprisingly, the relationship between γ (the conflict parameter) and σ (the comple-
mentarity parameter) characterizes the direction of diversity’s direct effect on productivity.
If groups are largely substitutable for one and other and costs are high, diversity is likely
to be detrimental. Conversely, benefits will supersede costs if minority participation com-
plements the abilities of the majority workforce in problem-solving and decision-making
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processes. Given the assumptions made thus far, the direct effect of diversity will be positive
if Inequality (12) holds.11
γ <
(
α
(1−N ·Θ)ΘN−1M
)
(12)
·
(
MΘσ −ΘMσ
(N − 1) ·Θσ +Mσ
)
3 Utility and Labor Mobility
3.1 Utility
The production function in (9) will produce many interesting results and key insights into
the direct macroeconomic effects of diversity, but if diversity influences individual location
and migration decisions, it will indirectly affect aggregate output as well. The analysis now
turns to a more formal exploration of labor mobility, an explicit indirect utility specification,
and a more nuanced series of productivity ramifications.
Suppose a country has two geographically large regions so that agents must produce
output in the region of their residence.12 Assume that each region maintains an equal
technology level and capital-labor ratio. Individuals earn utility from two sources. First,
agents seek increased real wages. I measure the real wage as the marginal product of labor,
adjusted by a cost of living equal to the marginal product of capital.13 Second, Marsden’s
(1988) sociological account of “Homogeneity in Confiding Relations” notes that individuals
prefer to communicate, socialize, and live with members of their own race.14 Thus, an
increase in the population (or labor force) share of a person’s racial group causes his or
her utility to rise. Altogether, Uj,k = U
(
θj,k,
MPLj,k
MPKj,k
)
represents a generic indirect utility
11Assuming that agents earn a wage equal to their marginal productivity of labor, this model implies that
minorities will earn more than majority workers if and only if Inequality (12) holds. Thus, the model can
explain why minorities often earn low wages without appealing to discrimination or intrinsic productivity
differences across groups. I caution that, in reality, discrimination probably exists. If so, it may be possible
for minorities to earn lower wages regardless of whether diversity generates macroeconomic productivity
gains. Thus, I view the rigid link between the marginal effects of diversity and relative wages as a limitation,
rather than a strength, of the model.
12Since individuals could live in one city or neighborhood and work in another, this model is inappropriate
for examination of neighborhood or city segregation. Instead, see Cutler and Glaeser (1997) or Glaeser,
Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1995).
13To ensure all individuals earn positive wages, assume γ <
α·θσj
(1−N·θj)
(
N∏
i=1
θi
)(
N∑
i=1
θσ
i
) for all j = 1, ...,N such
that θj <
1
N
.
14Also see Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) work on “Economics and Identity,” or Briggs’s (2002) account of
race, segregation, and social capital.
9
function (increasing in each argument) for a person of Type j working in Region k. I adopt
the specific utility function in Equation (13).
Uj,k = θj,k · MPLj,k
MPKj,k
(13)
=
(
Kk
Lk
)
·
α · θ
σ
j,k − γ · (1−N · θj,k)
(
N∏
i=1
θi,k
)(
N∑
i=1
θσi,k
)
(1− α) ·
N∑
i=1
θσi

Equilibrium requires individuals of Type j to have equal utility across regions so that
Uj,k = Uj,kˆ. Suppose a country has two regions characterized by the semi-symmetric assump-
tions of θi,k = Θk, i = 1...N − 1 for minority groups and θN,k = Mk = 1− (N − 1)Θk for the
majority. Assume that the regions are identical except, potentially, in the minority share of
the labor force. There is one unique value of γ that permits Θk to vary yet still preserves
equal utility across regions. Let UMin,k and UMaj,k represent the utility levels of the minority
and majority groups in Region k, respectively. Then UMin,1 = UMin,2 either when Θ1 = Θ2,
or when γ satisfies Equation (14).15
γ =
(
α
(1−NΘ1)ΘN−11 M1 − (1−NΘ2)ΘN−12 M2
)
(14)
·
(
Θσ1
(N − 1)Θσ1 +Mσ1
− Θ
σ
2
(N − 1)Θσ2 +Mσ2
)
3.2 Equilibrium Location Decisions
Under the semi-symmetric assumption, it is straightforward to show that if minorities reside
in each region, then the maximum value of y (the weighted average output per worker in
the two regions) occurs when the country is perfectly integrated (that is, when the level
of diversity is equal in regions one and two so that Θ1 = Θ2). The condition in (14),
however, suggests multiple equilibria are possible. Diversity plays an important role in
determining individuals’ location decisions. Increases in diversity that promote integration
will also indirectly increase national productivity. Thus, to understand the economic effects
of diversity, we must first identify potential equilibria and determine whether they are stable.
15The economy must also maintain UMaj,1 = UMaj,2 to ensure that the majority group chooses not to
migrate. Simple algebra illustrates that UMin,1 = UMin,2 implies UMaj,1 = UMaj,2 as well, so that this
second equality restriction is redundant.
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3.2.1 Perfect Segregation
In an extreme equilibrium, a country may be perfectly segregated. In this case, the desire of
individuals to live among their own group dominates the potential to earn higher wages in
other regions. If we continue to assume that a majority exists in each of two regions, then the
majority group will compose 100% of one region and 50% of the other. However, members
of the majority who remain in the diverse region still have an incentive to migrate. Hence,
the model’s assumptions become untenable. By removing the assumption that a majority
group exists in each region, perfect segregation would then imply that the majority group
will compose 100% of one region, and each of the other groups will maintain a population
share Θ = 1
N−1
in the other region.
An even more realistic assumption is that if groups are choosing to completely segregate,
they will continue to do so until each group belongs to one of N exclusive nation-states. In
other words, the prior assumption that only two regions exist also becomes inappropriate.
By allowing nation-states, individuals will earn U =
(
K
L
) (
α
1−α
)
in their own region and
U = 0 if they choose to move to another region. Thus, this perfectly segregated equilibrium
is stable, as no individual has an incentive to migrate. The perfectly segregated outcome
may help explain the historical emergence of European nation-states,16 but is not useful for
analyzing migration dynamics since individuals never have an incentive to integrate.
3.2.2 Perfect Integration
The other extreme possibility is that a country is at a perfectly integrated equilibrium in
which the minority share of the labor force is equal across regions. If two regions exist,
Θ1 = Θ2 implies UMin,1 = UMin,2 as well. Such an equilibrium is stable only if an exogenous
increase in diversity within one region causes minorities to migrate to the other region. That
is, if individuals redistribute themselves and return to a perfectly integrated equilibrium.
Intuitively, an increase in diversity will have two potentially opposing effects on minori-
ties. First, they will earn greater utility from living among members of their own group.
Unfortunately, however, they may also suffer lower real wages resulting from increased con-
flict with other groups. Thus, the stability of an integrated equilibrium critically depends
upon the sign of ∂UMin
∂Θ
. If minorities experience net gains from diversity, an exogenous
increase in diversity within Region 1 will attract additional minorities from Region 2, and
perfect integration is unstable. Conversely, integration is stable if the increase in diversity re-
duces utility and causes minorities to redistribute evenly across regions. Formally, ∂UMin
∂Θ
> 0
16See Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005) for a similar result.
11
if condition (15) holds.
∂UMin
∂Θ
> 0 if (15)
α · σ ·Θσ−1 ·Mσ−1 > γ · ((N − 1)Θσ +Mσ)2
· ((1−NΘ)2 (N − 1)ΘN−2 −NΘN−1M)
Assume σ > 0 so that labor groups are grossly substitutable and the left hand side of
(15) is positive. The right hand side of (15) is guaranteed to be positive if four or more labor
groups exist. For the special cases of N = 2 or N = 3, the right hand side is positive if Θ is
small (i.e., if Θ <
(2N−1)N−
√
(5N−4)N
2(N2−1)N
≡ Θ˜).17 Since production is log-linear in γ, Equation
(16) can identify the unique value of interaction costs (γ˜) that will determine whether an
increase in diversity will attract additional minorities to migrate. That is, Equations (15)
and (16) imply that ∂UMin
∂Θ
> 0 and perfectly integrated equilibria are unstable if one of the
three conditions in (17) is satisfied.
γ˜ ≡
(
α · σ ·Θσ−1 ·Mσ−1
((N − 1)Θσ +Mσ)2
)
(16)
·
(
1(
(1−NΘ)2 (N − 1)ΘN−2 −NΘN−1M)
)
(1) γ < γ˜ and N ≥ 4 (17)
(2) γ < γ˜ and N ≤ 3 and Θ ≤ Θ˜
or (3) γ > γ˜ and N ≤ 3 and Θ > Θ˜
The intuition behind this result is simple. Minorities experience net utility gains from
increases in diversity so long as the costs of interaction and associated wage penalties remain
low. Note that condition (3) implies that if few groups exist and the minority population
share is already high, diversity will augment utility regardless of the size of interaction costs
(since γ˜ < 0 in this case).
The results indicate that perfectly integrated equilibria are stable only if exogenous inter-
action costs (γ) are high. High costs imply large wage penalties for living in diverse regions.
Thus, if one region experiences a rise in diversity, groups will redistribute themselves evenly
across regions. This suggests an interesting counter-intuitive result: since high interaction
costs promote integration, and perfectly integrated equilibria produce the maximum level of
17Note that Θ˜ exceeds the maximum value of diversity possible if a majority group exists when N > 3.
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aggregate productivity, an increase in interaction costs may be able to promote productivity.
Section 3.2.4 explores this possibility in greater detail.
3.2.3 Partial Segregation
Equation (14) identifies the level of interaction costs that permits a partially segregated
equilibrium such that UMin,1 = UMin,2 and UMaj,1 = UMaj,2, but the level of diversity differs
across regions (that is, Θ1 
= Θ2). Define this value of γ as γSeg (Θ1,Θ2). Equation (15)
suggests that interaction costs will also play a fundamental role in determining the stability
of the equilibrium.
Assume (for simplicity) that N > 3 groups exist so that Condition (1) among the in-
equalities in (17) determines the migration decisions of individuals. Then γ˜ (from Equation
(16)) represents the threshold such that if diversity costs exceed this value, minorities will
be attracted to the less diverse region. Since γ˜ is a function of Θ, migration decisions for
partially segregated societies will depend upon the relative values of γ˜ in Regions 1 and 2.
Stability of equilibria requires that migration decisions are insensitive to the region in which
an exogenous diversity shock occurs, and is determined by the size of the observed level of
interaction costs, γSeg (Θ1,Θ2), relative to γ˜ (Θ1) and γ˜ (Θ2). Table 1 summarizes possible
outcomes.
Table 1: Stability of Partially Segregated Equilibria Assuming that Diversity is Greater in
Region 2.
Scenario Stability of Migration Consequence
Partial Segregation of Increased Diversity
(1) γ˜ (Θ1) < γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) < γ˜ (Θ2) Stable Segregation
↑ Θ1 →Minorities attracted To Region 2
↑ Θ2 →Minorities attracted To Region 2
(2) γ˜ (Θ1) > γSeg (Θ1,Θ2) > γ˜ (Θ2) Stable Integration
↑ Θ1 →Minorities attracted To Region 1
↑ Θ2 →Minorities attracted To Region 1
(3) γ˜ (Θ1) > γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) < γ˜ (Θ2) Unstable
↑ Θ1 →Minorities attracted To Region 1 ↑ Θ1 → Integration
↑ Θ2 →Minorities attracted To Region 2 ↑ Θ2 → Segregation
(4) γ˜ (Θ1) < γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) > γ˜ (Θ2) Unstable
↑ Θ1 →Minorities attracted To Region 2 ↑ Θ1 → Segregation
↑ Θ2 →Minorities attracted To Region 1 ↑ Θ2 → Integration
Assume Region 2 is more diverse so that Θ1 < Θ2. If Region 1 experiences an ex-
ogenous increase in diversity and γ˜ (Θ1) < γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2), Equation (15) implies that mi-
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norities will earn less utility in Region 1, and therefore desire to move to Region 2. Sim-
ilarly, minorities will move to Region 2 if diversity exogenously increases in Region 2 and
γSeg (Θ1,Θ2) < γ˜ (Θ2) since observed interaction costs are lower than the threshold estab-
lished in (16). The equilibrium is stable since migration responses do not depend upon which
region experiences an exogenous diversity shock. Therefore, partially segregated equilibria
will be stable and increases in diversity will induce the economy to become more segre-
gated if γ˜ (Θ1) < γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) < γ˜ (Θ2) and Θ1 < Θ2. Stable equilibria also occur when
γ˜ (Θ1) > γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) > γ˜ (Θ2) and Θ1 < Θ2. In this case, however, diversity shocks attract
minorities to the less diverse Region 1. Thus, diversity would encourage integration.
Partially segregated equilibria are also possible. Suppose γ˜ (Θ1) > γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) < γ˜ (Θ2)
and Θ1 < Θ2. Low values of γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) will attract minorities to the region experiencing
a diversity shock. If the shock occurs in Region 1, the country will integrate. If it occurs in
Region 2, the country will segregate. The results are opposite from the unstable equilibria
defined by high interaction costs, γ˜ (Θ1) < γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) > γ˜ (Θ2), since high costs imply
that minorities will leave the region experiencing the shock.
In principle, any of the four scenarios in Table 1 could arise. A more useful exercise
is to ask which scenario is likely. First, unstable equilibria are unsustainable in the long
run. Instead, assume that the economy is at a stable partially segregated equilibrium. The
relevant question becomes whether or not γ˜ (Θ1) > γ˜ (Θ2) when Θ1 < Θ2. If so, then
diversity leads to integration and indirectly generates productivity gains. This condition
holds when the expression in (18) is greater than one.
γ˜ (Θ1)
γ˜ (Θ2)
=
(
Θσ−11 ·Mσ−11
Θσ−12 ·Mσ−12
)
(18)
·
(
(N − 1) ·Θσ2 +Mσ2
(N − 1) ·Θσ1 +Mσ1
)2
·
(
(1−N ·Θ2)2 (N − 1)ΘN−22 −N ·ΘN−12 M2
(1−N ·Θ1)2 (N − 1)ΘN−21 −N ·ΘN−11 M1
)
Equation (18) approaches infinity as Θ1 approaches 0, and it equals one when Θ1 = Θ2.
The function does not monotonically decrease, and many cases exist such that γ˜(Θ1)
γ˜(Θ2)
< 1.
However, if N > 3 groups exist, the more diverse region has a population size equal to
or larger than the other region (i.e., L1 ≤ L2 when Θ1 < Θ2), and national diversity is
limited to ensure that a majority group exists in all regions, this is sufficient (though not
necessary) to guarantee that γ˜ (Θ1) > γ˜ (Θ2) when Θ1 < Θ2.
18 That is, it is likely that
18The numerator of γ˜(Θ1)
γ˜(Θ2)
monotonically decreases in Θ1, while the denominator is sure to increase in Θ1
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γ˜ (Θ1) > γ˜ (Θ2) when Θ1 < Θ2 and that diversity causes partially segregated countries to
integrate.19 Since integration bolsters productivity, diversity will indirectly increase national
output per worker.
3.2.4 Interaction Costs and Partially Segregated Equilibria
Legislators may be less interested in the consequences of diversity and more interested in
the effects that policy changes may have on productivity. In particular, governments may
have some control over a country’s institutions that influence the cost of interaction between
groups at a given level of diversity, γ. Diversity costs directly reduce output in the production
function. However, since γ exacerbates productivity losses for diverse societies, changes in γ
will also have consequences for individuals’ location decisions and therefore indirectly affect
productivity.
Suppose an economy is at equilibrium such that UMin,1 = UMin,2.
20 The difference in
utility generated by an increase in the cost parameter γ, imposing the semi-symmetric as-
sumption, is given by Equation (19).
∂ (UMin,1 − UMin,2)
∂γ
=
(
K
(1− α)L
)
· (19)(
(1−NΘ2)ΘN−12 M2 − (1−NΘ1)ΘN−11 M1
)
An increase in the cost parameter does not affect the difference in utility between Regions
1 and 2 if the country is perfectly integrated (i.e., if Θ1 = Θ2). However, the increase has
strong implications for partially segregated equilibria. Suppose more minorities reside in
Region 2 than in Region 1 so that Θ1 < Θ2. Then an increase in diversity costs will attract
minorities to Region 1 and therefore cause the country to integrate if utility in Region 1
becomes larger than that of Region 2 and Inequality (20) is satisfied.
∂ (UMin,1 − UMin,2)
∂γ
> 0 if (20)
(1−NΘ2)ΘN−12 M2
(1−NΘ1)ΘN−11 M1
> 1
if Θ1 ≤ N−2N·(N+1) . Restricting Θ¯ ≤ 12·(N−1)(1+λ) , where λ = L2L1 , ensures that Θ1 = 0 when the majority group
maintains 50% of the labor force in Region 2. If imposed, the maximum value of Θ1 =
1
2·(N−1)(1+λ) . This
value is certain to be less than N−2
N·(N+1) if N > 3 and λ > 1.
19This theoretical result also appears to be true in practice. The minority share of US employment
increased from 13.2% in 1970 to 25.5% in 2000, while the coefficient of variation across the continental US
states declined from 0.78 to 0.60. Similarly, the share of college-educated workers grew from 7.9% to 18.4%,
and the coefficient of variation decreased from 0.72 to 0.57.
20Also, UMaj,1 = UMaj,2.
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The left hand side of Inequality (20) equals one when Θ1 = Θ2 and is monotonically
increasing in Θ2 if N ≥ 4 or Θ2 ≤ Θ˜. Thus, these conditions are sufficient (but not neces-
sary) for ensuring that an increase in interaction costs will promote integration. Note the
similarity between this result and the stability of equilibria identified in (17). Together, the
conditions imply that low levels of interaction costs (γ) or diversity (Θ) will not permit stable
perfectly integrated equilibria, but that increases in interaction costs will encourage groups
to integrate. This seemingly counter-intuitive result becomes more obvious when considered
in the context of wages paid to minority workers. Firms pay minorities progressively lower
wages as their labor force participation rises. This cost of working with own-group members
becomes especially burdensome as conflict costs increase, since conflict disproportionately
hurts diverse societies. High costs, therefore, push minorities to seek better wages in regions
dominated by the majority. Members of the majority group operate in much the same way.
This migration occurs until costs are sufficiently high so that individuals are unwilling to
accept any additional wage reduction and therefore choose to perfectly integrate.
Since maximum productivity levels occur at perfectly integrated equilibria, Inequality
(20) generates the ironic conclusion that exogenous increases in the cost of interaction be-
tween groups can indirectly bolster productivity by encouraging groups to integrate. Con-
versely, efforts to reduce inter-group friction may simply cause individuals to segregate,
thereby indirectly reducing productivity. While interaction costs are certain to reduce out-
put for perfectly integrated societies, the effects are more nuanced for partially segregated
ones.
4 Simulated Economies
Structural estimation of the production function in Equation (9) is not possible since closed-
form solutions for σ do not exist. Reduced form estimation of the effects of diversity should
also account for segregation since diversity will generate differing consequences for partially
segregated and perfectly integrated countries. In the absence of reliable cross-country seg-
regation data, however, numerical analysis is required. The following subsections improve
understanding by simulating production for various parameter values.
4.1 Simulated Production
This subsection estimates the direct effects of diversity by simulating production according
to parameter values that characterize the college-educated labor force of the United States
in 2000. Assume labor’s share of income, α, equals 2/3. In 2000, Whites represented
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Figure 2: Maximum γ. Assume N = 5, α = 2
3
, and Θ = 0.05. The curve represents the
maximum value of γ such that diversity generates productivity gains.
roughly 82% of college-educated employment in the United States, with Asians (6.3%),
Blacks (6.2%), Hispanics (4.3%), and Others (1.6%) composing the remaining shares. To
closely approximate this demography, I adopt the semi-symmetric assumptions of Subsection
2.1 with N = 5 racial groups and Θ = 0.05.21
Figure 2 graphs the relationship between the substitutability of labor (σ) and the cost
of interaction parameter (γ). The curve represents the maximum value of γ such that
an increase in diversity (Θ) generates productivity gains. If the costs of interaction are
sufficiently low, or if labor types are highly complementary, an increase in minority group
size will augment productivity. Figure 3 demonstrates that marginal effects also critically
depend upon the initial level of diversity. The maximum value of γ such that an increase in
diversity generates productivity gains is much smaller for large values of Θ.
Since regressions cannot uniquely estimate σ and γ, it is difficult to argue in favor of one
combination of the parameter values over another, but the elasticity of substitution between
White and Minority workers offers suggestions. Regressions estimate an elasticity of 10 —
a large but plausible value.22 Though the elasticity is high, it still implies that diversity
generates economically significant effects.
21As an alternative, simulations could adopt Θ = 0.0675 to characterize the entirety of US employment
in 2000. However, the assumption of equal shares across minority groups becomes less tenable, as Asians,
Blacks, Hispanics, and Others represent 3.5%, 9.6%, 10.3%, and 2.1% of employment, respectively.
22This figure represents the elasticity of substitution between White and Non-White college-educated wage
earning males 30 to 50 years old. The elasticity across races for men without a college degree is approximately
20. Given that diversity complements creativity, decision making, and idea generation, one should expect
this greater substitutability across races at lower skill levels. See the Appendix for regression details.
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3
. This graph represents the
maximum value of γ such that diversity generates productivity gains. Low existing diversity
(Θ) and substitutability of labor (σ)make it more likely that increased diversity will improve
productivity.
Figure 4 demonstrates that only low γ values, coupled with σ values near one, can
generate high elasticities of substitution.23 This latter requirement is not surprising — labor
types become more substitutable as σ approaches unity, and a change in relative wages
forces firms to hire the group that earns lower wages. Less obviously, groups are also more
substitutable when γ is small. If conflict is low, firms employ the least expensive workers. If
conflict is high, firms force minority workers to take massive pay cuts.
Suppose that σ = 0.95 and γ = 175 so that the elasticity of substitution approximately
equals 10. Figure 5 graphs output per worker (y) as a function of diversity (Θ). Results
are normalized so that y = 1 in the absence of diversity.24 Given the parameter values,
maximum productivity occurs when each minority group represents 8.8% of the labor force.
Moving from complete homogeneity to this level of diversity would cause output per worker
to rise 3.4%. Alternatively, consider that the racial diversity of college-educated workers in
the US rose from approximately Θ = 0.035 in 1990 to Θ = 0.05 in 2000.25 The model implies
23In the special case of γ = 0, the elasticity of substitution reduces to the typical CES value of 11−σ .
24Also note that y = 1 in the special case when diversity is neutral (i.e., when diversity does not affect
productivity).
25In 1990, Whites composed 86% of college-educated employment, with Blacks (5.8%), Asians (4.5%),
Hispanics (33.3%) and Others (0.3%) representing the remaining shares.
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Figure 4: Elasticity of Substitution. AssumeΘ = 0.05. The elasticity of substitution between
minority and majority-group workers decreases in γ. The light grey, dark grey, and black
curves represent σ = 0.95, σ = 0.9, and σ = 0.7, respectively.
that this increase directly caused a 0.6% rise in national productivity.
4.2 Diversity, Conflict Costs, Cross-Region Demography, and Na-
tional Productivity
The previous subsection simulated the direct effects of diversity assuming that minorities
maintain an equal share of employment across regions. However, Section 3 demonstrated
that a country can become segregated when parameter values lead to an equilibrium in which
two regions have differing levels of diversity. Relative to an even (or perfectly integrated) dis-
tribution of diversity, partial segregation will result in reduced macroeconomic productivity.
This section adopts a series of diversity (Θ), interaction cost (γ), and labor substitutability
(σ) values to gain insight into how diversity and policy decisions influence segregation and
thus indirectly affect macroeconomic output per worker.
4.2.1 Diversity, Migration Decisions, and National Productivity
People may choose to forgo wage gains in order to live among members of their own group.
The potential existence of such segregation creates a more nuanced relationship between
diversity and productivity. Consider an economy with σ = 0.95, N = 5, and α = 2
3
.
Assume the level of employment in each region is identical (L1 = L2) so that the average
(or national) level of diversity in Regions 1 and 2 is Θ¯ = Θ1+Θ2
2
. Although Section 4.1
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Figure 5: Diversity and Productivity. Assume γ = 175 and σ = 0.95. Maximum productivity
occurs when the labor force share (Θ) of each minority group equals 8.8%. In this case, output
per worker (y) is 3.4% higher than in the absence of diversity (in which case y = 1).
argued for γ = 175, his level of interaction costs is too low for integration to occur at any
level of diversity. Instead, note that each minority group maintained about 6.85% of the
college-educated workforce in US states with above-average levels diversity, but just 3.15%
in states with below-average diversity.26 If σ = 0.95, then γ = 2600 closely approximates
this distribution of workers when Θ¯ = 0.05.
Figure 6 illustrates the migration consequences of increased national diversity by display-
ing graphs of UMin,1− UMin,2 as a function of Θ2 for several Θ¯ values. (Each graph exhibits
odd symmetry around Θ¯ since Θ1 = 2 · Θ¯ − Θ2). Minorities will migrate from Region 2 to
Region 1 (and cause Θ2 to decline) when UMin,1 − UMin,2 > 0. Equilibrium is reached when
UMin,1 − UMin,2 = 0. Stability requires that the economy responds to shocks by returning
the allocation of groups to its initial position.
The top panel of Figure 6 demonstrates that perfectly segregated equilibria arise when
initial levels of national diversity (Θ¯ = 0.04) are low. That is, UMin,1 is always greater than
UMin,2, so all minorities move to Region 1. If the total labor force size remains equal across
regions (as assumed), the majority group will not completely vacate Region 1 despite having
an incentive to do so. Thus, the assumption of equal labor force size becomes untenable.
Instead, groups are likely to form nation states in which members from disparate groups do
not interact. Any growth among a particular group will be concentrated in one region, and
groups never integrate.
26Whites composed 88% of the college-educated workforce in states with below-average diversity, and 74%
in states with above average diversity.
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Figure 6: Diversity and Integration. Assume σ = 0.95, γ = 2600, N = 5, and α = 2
3
. The
top, middle, and bottom panels assume and Θ¯ = 0.04, 0.05, and 0.06, respectively. Minorities
will migrate from Region 2 to Region 1 and Θ2 will decrease when UMin,1 − UMin,2 > 0.
Low levels of national diversity
(
Θ¯
)
promote segregated equilibria, while increased diversity
facilitates an even distribution of minorities across regions.
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The second panel, in contrast, shows that partially segregated equilibria are possible at
higher levels of initial diversity. Suppose that Θ¯ = 0.05. Then the equilibrium distribution of
workers, Θ1 ≈ 0.032 and Θ2 ≈ 0.068, approximates the college-educated workforce in 2000.
Moreover, this equilibrium is stable since γ˜ (0.032) > 2600 > γ˜ (0.068) as described in Table
1.
Section 3.2.3 demonstrated that continued increases in diversity would induce further
integration. If diversity continues to grow, the country will become fully integrated as il-
lustrated in the third panel of Figure 6 (Θ¯ = 0.06). Since maximum productivity occurs
when a country fully integrates (as discussed in Section 3), diversity can indirectly raise
output per worker by reducing segregation. Once a country achieves full integration, para-
meter values determine whether further increases in diversity are beneficial or detrimental.
Gains are likely to persist if conflict costs are low or complementarities are high. These
parameters could assume country-specific values. Countries that have established sound in-
stitutions that manage diversity well might have low conflict costs. Complementarities could
be greater for economies on the technological frontier that rely upon extensive innovation
and idea generation.
Figure 7 displays the relationship between the total minority share of the national pop-
ulation and aggregate output per worker assuming σ = 0.95, N = 5, α = 2
3
, γ = 2600, and
L1 = L2.
27 If the country was perfectly integrated, Equation (11) implies that increases in
diversity would reduce output per worker when Θ¯ > 0.37. However, utility considerations
guarantee that the country will be partially segregated. Diversity induces integration and
indirectly raises productivity. By increasing the employment share of each minority group
from Θ¯ = 0.047 to Θ¯ = 0.05 (a modest gain in the total minority share from 18.8% to 20%),
integration causes productivity to rise by 4%, and output per worker is 0.6% higher than
the level that would occur in a homogenous country.
Segregation plays a clear and important role in determining the net effects of diversity, and
economists should control for segregation in empirical analyses. Fortunately for practitioners,
the relationship between diversity and productivity remains roughly quadratic. Empiricist
may still be able to approximate the effect of diversity without segregation data. This would,
however, require that regressions include a cross section of countries with disparate levels of
diversity. Furthermore, one should exercise caution in making unqualified statements about
the costs and merits of diversity, as the net effects will depend upon relative segregation
levels.
27Note that multiple equilibria are possible (i.e., a country may be either fully integrated or segregated,
depending upon parameter values and initial conditions). Thus, no functional relationship between diversity
and productivity exists.
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Figure 7: Diversity and National Productivity. Assume σ = 0.95, N = 5, α = 2
3
, γ = 2600,
L1 = L2, and Θ¯ = 0.05. Let y = 1 represent the level of output per worker if diversity
does not affect aggregate productivity. Output per worker depends upon a country’s total
minority share of the population,
(
(N − 1) θ¯), and interregional segregation.
4.2.2 Policy, Migration Decisions, and National Productivity
Section 3.2.4 demonstrated that institutional policy changes that alter the costs of interac-
tion between groups will influence individuals’ migration decisions and thus indirectly affect
aggregate productivity. Again, closed form solutions for the magnitude of these effects do
not exist, so numerical analysis is required. Continue to assume that an economy is charac-
terized by σ = 0.95, N = 5, and α = 2
3
. Also let Θ¯ = 0.05 and L1 = L2. Figure 8 illustrates
the migration consequences of policy changes by displaying graphs of UMin,1 − UMin,2 as a
function of Θ2 for several γ values. As in Figure 6, minorities will migrate from Region 2 to
Region 1 (and cause Θ2 to decline) when UMin,1 − UMin,2 > 0.
The top panel assumes γ = 175 to match an elasticity of substitution equal to 10 (as
advocated in Subsection 4.1). Note that the perfectly integrated equilibrium in which Θ1 =
Θ2 = 0.05 is unstable since 175 < γ˜ from Equation (16). Instead, low interaction costs cause
groups to perfectly segregate. That is, UMin,1 is always greater than UMin,2, so all groups
form nation states, and individuals from varied groups will not interact.
The summary in Table 1 indicates that higher levels of interaction costs will permit stable
partially segregated equilibria if γ˜ (Θ1) < γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) < γ˜ (Θ2) or γ˜ (Θ1) > γ
Seg (Θ1,Θ2) >
γ˜ (Θ2). The second panel of Figure 8 increases γ to 2600. The perfectly integrated equi-
librium remains unstable since 2600 < γ˜. A slight negative shock to Θ2 at this equilib-
rium will make Region 1 more attractive to minorities. Massive migration occurs until
23
0.025 0.05
θ2
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
U1MIN−U
2
MIN
0.025 0.05
θ2
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
U1MIN−U
2
MIN
0.025 0.05
θ2
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
U1MIN−U
2
MIN
Figure 8: Conflict Costs and Integration. Assume σ = 0.95, N = 5, α = 2
3
, and Θ¯ =
0.05. The top, middle, and bottom panels assume γ = 175, 2600, and 3000, respectively.
Minorities will migrate from Region 2 to Region 1 and Θ2 will decrease when UMin,1 −
UMin,2 > 0. Low γ values promote segregated equilibria, while high γ values ensure an even
distribution of minorities across regions.
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Figure 9: Interaction Costs and National Productivity. Assume σ = 0.95, N = 5, α = 2
3
,
L1 = L2, and Θ¯ = 0.05, and let y = 1 represent the level of output per worker if diversity
does not affect aggregate productivity. Increasing the costs of interaction between groups
will induce individuals to integrate, and may therefore raise productivity over a range of
values.
Θ1 ≈ 0.032. Section 4.2.2 argued that this partially segregated equilibrium is stable since
γ˜ (0.032) > 2600 > γ˜ (0.068). Graphically, we see that any shock to the relative diversity in
Regions 1 and 2 will return the economy to this point.
The final panel in Figure 8 assumes γ = 3000. High interaction costs eliminate stable
partially segregated equilibria and instead encourage individuals to migrate until groups are
perfectly integrated across regions. Perfect integration is stable since 3000 > γ˜ and N > 3
(see Section 3.2.2).
Policy changes generate important productivity consequences. First, note that the cost
parameter (γ) will not affect perfectly segregated countries (that is, nation states), since
members from different groups do not interact with each other. Changes in γ will, however,
have large implications in all other scenarios. When γ permits partially segregated equilibria,
institutional changes that make interaction between groups more difficult will encourage
integration since minorities become less willing to suffer large wage penalties associated with
living among members of their own group. This integration stimulates economic activity by
increasing the supply of scarce (and complementary) minority groups in less diverse regions.
Thus, inter-group communication costs can ironically bolster productivity over a range of
values. After the country fully integrates, however, all further interaction costs will diminish
productivity.
Figure 9 demonstrates that the effects of such policy changes may be large. If σ = 0.95,
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N = 5, α = 2
3
, L1 = L2, and Θ¯ = 0.05, then an increase in interaction costs that moves
society from an extreme distribution in which nearly all minorities live in Region 2 (γ = 2350,
Θ1 = 0.0022, Θ2 = 0.0978) to a completely integrated equilibrium (γ = 2680, Θ1 = 0.05,
Θ2 = 0.05) will raise output per worker by 5.7%.
5 Conclusions
This paper developed a model of production that includes a term to capture the costs of
inter-group communication, allows complementarities between workers of different types, and
yet still nests the traditional Solow growth model within it. A simple relationship between
intergroup complementarities and costs of interaction determines whether diversity generates
direct productivity gains or losses in the absence of labor supply effects. Outcomes become
much more complex, however, in the presence of segregation.
Segregation can occur if individuals earn utility from residing among members of their
own group. If minority groups and interaction costs are small, groups will form separate
enclaves within a country. Members of disparate groups never interact, and nation states
arise. If either interaction costs or the minority share of national employment are at moder-
ate levels, however, the country will be partially segregated — diversity varies across regions,
but individuals have no incentive to migrate. Increases in diversity or interaction costs gen-
erally encourage further integration until all regions of a country maintain equal levels of
diversity. Importantly, maximum output always occurs when a country is fully integrated,
regardless of whether national diversity generates productivity gains or losses. Thus, when
diversity induces integration, it indirectly causes national productivity to rise. Once a coun-
try achieves full integration, continued increases in diversity will augment aggregate output
only if complementarities are high and interaction costs are low.
This theory of diversity, segregation, and productivity uncovers important policy and
empirical ramifications. Politically, it suggests that policy makers should undertake efforts to
decrease interregional segregation. If agents earn utility only from real wages and from living
among members of their own group, an increase in interaction costs will ironically augment
productivity by encouraging groups to integrate. Once a country is fully integrated, however,
these costs only serve to reduce output. Thus, other methods of encouraging integration (such
as increasing diversity, decreasing own-group preferences, or increasing utility from residing
among members of other groups) are likely to be more economically advantageous.
The model also implies that international empirical investigations of diversity will gener-
ate misleading results if they do not also consider the role of segregation. Reliable segregation
data is not likely to be available at the international level, however. Several solutions to this
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limitation exist. First, economists could instead assess the effects of interregional diversity
within a country. The model assumes that agents live and work in the same region. Agents
need not, however, live and work in the same neighborhood. Thus, within-region segrega-
tion should not be as detrimental as cross-regional segregation. Second, valid international
accounts of diversity are still possible without segregation data if economists are willing to
accept the analyst’s assumptions. For example, researchers could assume that interregional
segregation doesn’t exist, or that all countries are perfectly segregated. Also, panel analyses
that assume segregation is constant over time would be appropriate if they employ random
(or fixed) effects to control for segregation variation across countries. Finally, quadratic
models might provide a close approximation for the effects of diversity, while they would
also highlight that some countries benefit from increased heterogeneity and others do not.
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A Appendix — The Elasticity of Substitution
I employ a decennial dataset covering the contiguous US states from 1980 to 2000 to estimate
the elasticity of substitution between Whites and Non-Whites. The Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS) by Ruggles et. al. (2004) provides all necessary data to identify
a state’s labor supply and average wages paid to White and Non-White workers. I then
regress relative wages on relative labor supply according to variants of Equation (21).
ln
(
WhiteWages,t
NonWhiteWages,t
)
= α+ β · ln
(
WhiteEmps,t
NonWhiteEmps,t
)
(21)
+
2000∑
t=1990
δt ∗Decades,t + ǫs,t
Where s = 48 contiguous states, t = 3 decades.
Wage = Average wage earnings of Whites or Non-Whites.
Emp = Employment of Whites or Non-Whites.
Decade = Decade indicator variables for 1990 and 2000.
−1
β
= Implied elasticity of substitution.
The regressions in Table 2 use data on wage-earning men, 30 to 50 years old, with a college
degree to impute the elasticity of substitution between Whites and Non-Whites. Column
1 displays the results for direct estimation of Equation (21). The coefficient on relative
employment, -0.107, implies an elasticity of substitution between Whites and Non-Whites
of 9.346. However, relative wages could be endogenous. If a state pays disproportionately
more to White workers, it will attract a large number of White workers. Ten year lag
values of relative employment can serve as instruments for current-year values. Column 2
demonstrates that controlling for endogeneity decreases the elasticity of substitution to 8.547.
Columns 3 and 4 control for the possible effect of diversity on relative wages by including a
term measuring the minority share of a state’s employment. The coefficient is insignificant.
The regression in Column 5 drops observations in 1980 and 1990, and employs a 20 year lag
as an instrument for relative employment. This increases the elasticity to 12.346. Altogether,
the results suggest an elasticity of substitution between Whites and Non-Whites near 10 for
college-educated men in the United States.
If diversity complements creativity, decision making, and idea generation, the elasticity
of substitution across races should be lower for high skilled workers than for low skilled labor.
Table 3 repeats the specifications displayed in Table 2, but instead estimates the elasticity
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Table 2: Elasticity of Substitution. Wage Earning Males, 30-50 Years Old, with a College
Degree.
1 2 3 4 5
Instruments None
10 Year 
Lag
None
10 Year 
Lag
20 Year 
Lag
Decades Covered 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 2000
ln(Relative -0.107 -0.117 -0.142 -0.205 -0.081
 Employment) (0.031)*** (0.038)*** (0.045)*** (0.062)*** (0.027)***
Minority  -0.005 -0.012
 Employment Share (0.006) (0.007)
Constant 0.422 0.442 0.554 0.767 0.387
(0.068)*** (0.084)*** (0.165)*** (0.223)*** (0.059)***
Implied Elasticity of 
Substitution
9.346 8.547 7.042 4.878 12.346
Observations 144 142 144 142 48
R-Squared 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.21
Unit of observation: continental US states.
Relative Wage measured as wages paid to Whites divided 
     by wages paid to Non-Whites.
Relative Employment measured as White employees divided
     by Non-White employees.
Note: Only college-educated male employees between 30 and 50 
     years old are included in the calculation of state averages.
Instruments: Lag values of ln(Relative Employment).
Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** Coefficient significant at 1%
** Coefficient significant at 5%
* Coefficient significant at 10%
Decade indicator variables suppressed.
Dependent Variable: ln(Relative Wage)
of substitution between Whites and Non-Whites for wage earning men who do not hold a
college degree. As expected, the estimated elasticity is much higher for low skilled labor, as
regressions suggest a value near 20.
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Table 3: Elasticity of Substitution. Wage Earning Males, 30-50 Years Old, without a College
Degree.
1 2 3 4 5
Instruments None
10 Year 
Lag
None
10 Year 
Lag
20 Year 
Lag
Decades Covered 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 2000
ln(Relative -0.054 -0.050 -0.042 -0.023 -0.043
 Employment) (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.019)** (0.021) (0.012)***
Minority  0.001 0.003
 Employment Share (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.342 0.332 0.315 0.260 0.349
(0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.061)*** (0.068)*** (0.021)***
Implied Elasticity of 
Substitution
18.519 20.000 23.810 43.478 23.256
Observations 144 143 144 143 48
R-Squared 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.31
Unit of observation: continental US states.
Relative Wage measured as wages paid to Whites divided 
     by wages paid to Non-Whites.
Relative Employment measured as White employees divided
     by Non-White employees.
Note: Only male employees between 30 and 50 years old without
     college degrees are included in the calculation of state averages.
Instruments: Lag values of ln(Relative Employment).
Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** Coefficient significant at 1%
** Coefficient significant at 5%
* Coefficient significant at 10%
Decade indicator variables suppressed.
Dependent Variable: ln(Relative Wage)
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